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"Alongside" the Fast Track:
Environmental and Labor Issues in
FTAA
Charles Tiefer*
Fast track authority' allows the President to negotiate,
within certain Congressionally-established parameters, international trade agreements which are then submitted for Congressional approval on a strictly up-or-down basis, preventing
Congress from amending the agreements. 2 In 1997, Congress
balked at renewing the President's fast track authority.3 This
non-renewal came just when momentum was building for the
4
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement.
President Clinton will have to proceed with FTAA negotiations in the face of sharp Congressional division, as manifested
5
by the House's refusal to extend fast track in November 1997.
Environmental and labor issues have mattered crucially in recent debates, suggesting that these issues will go "alongside" the
fast track, carried along with it although not entirely aboard it.
This represents the culmination of the late-1990s legislative-executive debate over which issues are appropriate to address in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
Former Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel for the House of Representatives,
1984-1995. B.A., Columbia University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977.
The author thanks Lori Sherwood for her research assistance, and Emily R.
Greenberg and her skilled staff for their library and computer assistance.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 102, 151, 88 Stat. 1978,
1982-84, 2001-04 (1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191
(1994)).
3. See John E. Yang & Terry M. Neal, "FastTrack" Defeat IllustratesDivision That Could Block Clinton Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at All; see
generally I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION (1997).
4. See generally Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements"--An Interim
Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997) [hereinafter Garcia, Americas Agreements].
5. See Yang & Neal, supra note 3, at All.
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the context of trade agreements, as well as a more fundamental
6
long-term evolution in the United States "trade constitution."
In the 1990s, the existence of a political balance between
supporters and opponents of the fast track, both on the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and on the FTAA, resulted primarily from core issues of job and general economic
insecurity linked to the trend towards globalization. 7 The single
largest legal controversy affecting the wavering votes in Congress, however, concerned the treatment of environmental and
labor issues. 8 From 1991 through 1993, public insistence on inclusion of environmental and labor issues in NAFTA culminated
in the execution of NAFTA side agreements addressing those issues. 9 Since 1994, as the negotiation of the FTAA became entwined with the extension of fast track legislation, inclusion of
environmental and labor issues in trade negotiations has remained one of the largest legal controversies in Congress. 10 In
1995 and 1996, the new Republican Congressional majority
fought against what it considered excessive inclusion of such issues. 1" Then, in 1997, the strength of Congressional resistance
to fast track extension clearly made the point that such issues
had to be included to a high degree.' 2 Consequently, the key
6. The phrase "trade constitution" is used to describe the set of constitutional, statutory, rule, and precedential prescriptions that allocate authority
and direct the interactions between the three branches of government as they
make trade policy. See generally Michael J. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.

687 (1996); Natalie R. Minter, Article, FastTrack Procedures:Do They Infringe
upon Congressional ConstitutionalRights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 107
(1995); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing InternationalTrade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994); Patti Goldman, The Democratizationof
the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631
(1994) (all discussing topics related to the composition of the "trade
constitution").
7. See Robert S. Greenberger, As U.S. Exports Rise, More Workers Benefit,
and Favor Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1997, at Al (noting that as the
economy strengthens, and these fears lessen, opposition to free trade agreements has been weakening).
8. See David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion of Western
Hemisphere Free Trade: Participantor Observer?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
381, 396 (1997).
9. See Talks on NAFTA Side Deals To Start Week of March 15, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 18, 1993, at A3.
10. See Gantz, supra note 8, at 396.
11. See John Maggs, Chile's Move to Mercosur May Pave Its Way into
NAFTA, J. COM., July 8, 1996, at 3C.
12. See Bob Davis, Pledges Made to Democrats on Fast Track, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 1997, at A4.
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point of inflection in the debate has become the degree of inclusion of environmental and labor issues.
Beyond the recent legislative-executive debate, fast track
treatment of environmental and labor issues represents the culmination of a more fundamental long-term evolution in the
"trade constitution." Executive Branch trade negotiation involves two interrelated processes: the Congressional-Presidential interaction and the international negotiations themselves. 13
Since the 1974 Trade Act, Presidential trade negotiations, and
Congress' role in them, have focused on issues other than simple
reciprocal tariff reduction. 14 The newer, more complex issues require a quality of Congressional-Presidential interaction heretofore unknown. Moreover, as the emphasis in trade agreement
negotiations shifts to participation in regional trading blocs, integration among national participants deepens, 15 which brings
to the fore environmental and labor issues that developed and
developing countries handle differently. The environmental and
labor law of advanced countries like the United States becomes
more internationally oriented because of this increasing shift toward economic globalization and regional integration. 1 6 Thus,
these issues become central for negotiations toward the FTAA.
Moreover, resolution of these issues becomes increasingly
dependent on how aggressively the United States advocates international progress on them. The unresponsiveness of the
WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment has disappointed
hopes of environmental proponents that the United States
might find ready international support on their issues. 17 Simi13. Robert Putnam has argued that trade negotiators must simultaneously
play two "games," one at the international bargaining table, and one with the
legislative branch. See Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 434 (1988).
14. Until recently, negotiations and Congressional implementation addressed "non-tariff barriers" to trade. This term is used to denote a host of matters from subsidies to procurement favoritism. Only in the past decade have
environmental and labor issues become the most important particular subset of
non-tariff barriers. See Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization,InternationalInstitutions, and the Erosion of NationalSovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1944, 1945 (1997).
15. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS 464-65 (3d ed. 1995).
16. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-EnvironmentNegotiations in the EU,
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L
L. 231, 233 (1997).
17. See WTO Trade and Environment Committee to Look at Several Issues,
Official Says, Intl Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 25, 1997, available in Westlaw,
BNA-BTD Database; Environment Committee Stalled over Language on WTO
Standards,13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1707 (Nov. 6, 1996); Committee
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larly, Latin American' 8 negotiating partners in FTAA resist in-

clusion of environmental and labor issues. 19
Hence, the treatment of these issues in the 1997 debate over
fast track extension marks a significant turn in the evolution of

the "trade constitution" by which the President and Congress exercise together the trade agreement power. 20 In a number of
ways, the precise terms of the 1997 debate registered how these

issues have consolidated their distinct, if limited, hold on the
trade negotiation agenda. 2 1 After the 1994 election, control of
Congress swung to the party opposed to what it considered ex-

cessive inclusion of environmental and labor issues in trade
agreements. 2 2 From a different direction, public sentiment
backlashed against trade agreements 2 3 as a result of many factors, including practical impairment of United States goals on

environmental and labor issues, and symbolic impairment of
United States sovereignty. 24 In response to the tension caused

by these conflicting currents, the importance that the trade constitution allocates to environmental and labor issues could shift
radically in either of two opposite ways. In one direction, Congress could follow partisan preferences manifested immediately
on Trade and Environment Report, WTO Doc. PRESS/TE 014 (Nov. 14, 1996),
discussed in Steinberg, supra note 16, at 242-44; Jennifer Schultz, The GATTI/
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1995). For a broad and not unsympathetic review
of the potential for a better relation of the WTO and environmental issues, see
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1997).
18. For simplicity, this Article will refer to the FTAA negotiating partners
as "Latin American," without in any way intending to slight the English and
French-speaking countries involved, from Canada to the Caribbean.
19. Compare Bolivian President Urges Omitting Labor/Environmentfrom
FTAA, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 803 (May 7, 1997) (opposing the
inclusion of such issues) and Trade Ministers Defer Decision on FTAA Negotiating Timetable Until Early 1998, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), May 21, 1997, available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database (deferring the inclusion of these issues for
further consideration) with Chile Willing to Accept Labor Accord to Join
NAFTA, USTR Official Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Mar. 11, 1997, available
in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database (accepting the inclusion of these issues).
20. See infra Part II.
21. Leading casebooks on international trade law already feature these issues. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 559-95, 998-1009; RAj BHALA,INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS

1183-1360 (1996).

22. See Maggs, supra note 11, at 3C.
23. See generally Nancy Dunne, U.S. Rallies for Uruguay Round Vote, FIN.
TimEs (London), Nov. 29, 1994, at 6 (discussing controversy over passage of
Uruguay Round agreements).
24. See Michael Sznajderman, Trade Pact Still Hangs in Balance: A Few
Days Could Derail 7 Years of GATT Talks, RicHmoND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Nov. 24,
1994, at El.
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after the 1994 election and exclude environmental and labor issues as extraneous interferences with trade agreements-much
as our negotiating partners, particularly developing countries,
seem to wish. In quite the opposite way, the combination of all
the public frustrations with globalization, especially on the perceived inadequacy of environmental and labor protections in
agreements with developing countries, could result in a long
lapse of fast track authority, and an extended hiatus in facilitative negotiation authority for the FTAA. 25 These powerful
thrusts from opposite sides have brought environmental and labor issues "alongside" the fast track. Recognition of this "alongside" status makes it possible to foreshadow the future of the
emerging field of environmental and labor law in trade agreements such as FTAA.
After a brief history of the fast track procedure and the
emergence of its use in connection with environmental and labor
issues, Part I of this Article discusses how the 1997 debate
placed these issues "alongside" the fast track. The 1997 debate
treated environmental and labor matters together with other aspects of trade agreements that go down the fast track, although
in ways that set them somewhat apart-in a word, not on, but
"alongside," the fast track. This is most clearly illustrated by
comparing the rejected alternatives for treatment of these issues
with the accepted "alongside" procedure. 26 Most significantly,
President Clinton, with eventual Congressional acquiescence,
rejected the 1995 Congressional alternative to get environmental and labor issues completely "off' the fast track. 2 7 The strong
intention to include such issues at least "alongside" is also apparent in the 1997 Congressional denial of the extension of fast
track authority. Such resistance overwhelmingly articulated
Congress' desire to exert even more pressure upon negotiating
28
partners on these issues.
With that foundation in the debate on fast track extension,
Part II of the Article analyzes the upcoming environmental and
labor issues in FTAA. Although ever since Congress added
25.

See Finlay Lewis, Trade Bill's Future Not Promising Despite Clinton

Pledge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 23, 1997, at A-26.
26. See discussion infra Part I.D.
27. See Fast Track Talks Fail, Ways and Means Markup Set, NATIONAL
JOURNAL'S CONGRESSDAILY, Sept. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
28. Doreen Hemlock, U.S. Making a Big Trade-Off."Fast-Track's Defeat
May Delay Free Trade Process, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Nov. 18,
1997, at 1H.
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these issues to the fast track in 1991, this subject has evolved
rapidly, a generalized treatment of these issues is now possible.
Considered first are those aspects common to both environmental and labor issues, such as the United States' push for nongovernmental organizations devoted to such issues to be allowed
to participate in trade negotiations, and the United States' policies regarding both external and domestic handling of such issues in the ultimate FTAA. 2 9 Part II then discusses the
particular environmental and labor issues individually. Particular environmental issues include process standards and the prevention of inappropriate comparative advantage as a result of
weak environmental standards enforcement. Particular labor
issues include the FTAA labor standards, from opposition to
31
child labor 3 ° to freedom of union organizing.
With these issues laid out, Part III addresses the flexible
nature of "trade-relatedness," which is the standard proposed in
the 1997 extension language, and thus the central concept of
the debate. "Trade-relatedness" determines whether and how an
issue enjoys coverage under the fast track authority. Part III
charts the dimensions of the debate, proposing a more refined
approach to determining "trade-relatedness."
Finally, Part IV attempts a synthesis regarding the prospects for environmental and labor issues "alongside" the fast
track for FTAA. In the two-level "games" of near-simultaneous
international and domestic negotiating, the United States must
now take Congress' position that these issues must be included
in negotiations, and effectuate it even when dealing with trade
partners who are relatively reluctant to include them. Part IV
first discusses how the United States and interested entities can
influence the process of negotiating an FTAA agreement. Next,
in addressing the external environmental and labor issues, Part
IV discusses how the United States can use a variety of traderelated approaches, both multilateral and unilateral, to influ29.

See generally Steve Charnovitz, Participationof Nongovernmental Or-

ganizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331
(1996) (arguing that nongovernmental organizations should be allowed to participate in international trade negotiations).
30. See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Stolen Youth: Brutalized Children, Globalization and the Campaign to End Child Labor, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan./
Feb. 1997, at 10; Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role of International Labour Standards, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 362 (1997).
31. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Buildingfor Western
Hemispheric Integration,17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 916-23 (1996) (describing labor standard challenges faced during the passage of NAFTA, especially
with regard to union organizing) [hereinafter Abbott, Foundation-Building].
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ence standards in other countries, without causing a breakdown
over these issues in efforts to have an FTAA at all. Finally, in
addressing domestic environmental regulations, Part IV discusses the United States commitment to including safeguards
against other nations' efforts to invalidate American domestic
protections.
I.

A.

1997 DEBATE ON FAST TRACK EXTENSION:
"ALONGSIDE" THE FAST TRACK, AND THE
REJECTED ALTERNATIVES

THE RISE OF FAST TRACK

The history of the fast track system can be divided into
three stages: 1934-74, 1974-91, and 1991-today. It deals with
the central tension of post-Depression U.S. trade history: how to
give the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements,
but still keep a large enough role for Congress so that the pace
and scope of trade expansion satisfy the business sectors looking
to benefit from them while meeting the public's concerns about
32
various potential problems.
As part of the New Deal reforms, Congress shifted toward
giving the President advance approval to negotiate tariff-reduction agreements with other countries, starting with the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. 33 Delegation of such authority
to the President continued by periodic extensions of authority,
with modifications, through 1967. 3 4 As the domestic implementation of trade agreements became increasingly controversial, a
seven-year stalemate occurred in the Johnson and Nixon admin32.

See generally CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE
(1995) (describing this tension).
33. Ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 13511354 (1994)). Between the Depression and the enactment of the Trade Act of
1974, the United States shifted away from the use of two mechanisms that had
kept most of the power in Congress: unilateral tariff legislation and treaty-making. But see Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets of InternationalTrade: A
Perspective on the Proposed United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 244 (1987) (noting that more recently, Congress has been
more active in shaping policy). Unilateral tariff legislation had led to excessively high protective tariffs, the ultimate expression of which was the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. Treaty-making,
by requiring two-thirds of the Senate for ratification, allowed a small group of
UNITED STATES

Senators to defeat agreements. The fullest recent discussion of this evolution is
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARv. L. REV.

799 (1995).
34. See

ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY 1929-1976 at 84-122 (1980); Carrier, supra note 6, at 698.
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istrations. 35 The key problem faced at that time, and resolved in
the Trade Act of 1974, concerned implementing legislation for
agreements to reduce non-tariff barriers. 3 6 Congress would not
simply delegate to the President the power to change domestic
non-tariff statutes. At the same time, Congress could not move
such legislation through the House and Senate using its old
mechanisms of internal restraint on amendment and debate be37
cause these mechanisms had broken down.
Therefore, in the 1974 Trade Act, Congress ushered in the
"fast track" arrangement, which is described in more detail below, using the anticipated steps for the FTAA as an example. 38
Under this arrangement, Congress periodically grants the President an extension of negotiating authority; after negotiation of
an agreement, the President submits an implementing bill to
Congress; and, finally, the House and Senate adopt or reject the
bill, without amendments or delays, in single up-or-down
votes. 3 9 In practice, Congress has had subtle but significant pro40
cedural ways to make changes.
35. See SHARYN O'HALLoRAN, POLITICS, PROCESS, AND AMERICAN TRADE
POLICY 95-96 (1994); BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN
POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS 62-63 (1994).
36. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(1)(B) (1994).
37. Notably, the historic power of the House Ways and Means Committee
to move legislation on matters like tax and tariffs unchanged through the
House floor, personified by Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.), had
given way in the late 1960s and early 1970s to a wave of reform in Congress
that had subjected such matters to more open processes. See I.M. DESTLER,
AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 67-71 (3d ed. 1995).
38. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 143 (1992); Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello,
The Fast Track Debate:A Prescriptionfor Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183, 184
(1992).
39. As one commentator put it, under the new procedure, "Congress now
had to pass legislation at both ends of a negotiation," with the Tokyo Round
GATT Agreement needing the Trade Act of 1974 to give the President negotiating authority, and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to implement the deal.
DESTLER, supra note 37, at 75.
40. Before submission of an implementing bill, the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means committees would separately consider the proposed implementation bill, in a procedure known as "nonmarkups." The term refers to
the stage in committee consideration of a bill, called "markup," when a committee considers amendments to the bill before deciding whether to vote to report it
to the floor of the chamber. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 167-170 (1989). The committees would then resolve their differences, in a procedure called a "nonconference." See DESTLER, supra note 37, at

73-75. These committees, in turn, made arrangements with other committees
that had jurisdiction over other titles. See id. at 76. Only when the committees
finished would the President submit the bill as changed by the committees, for
the Congress's up-or-down vote.
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By comparison, the Constitution itself, without a "fast
track" statute, merely allows the President to engage in a twophase process-negotiation and subsequent Congressional approval-for reaching trade agreements such as FTAA. 4 1 First,
the President negotiates an agreement with Latin American
countries, formulating objectives himself without necessarily receiving input from Congress. 4 2 Then, once the international
negotiators reach a proposed agreement, the second phase, Congressional approval, consists of ratification by two-thirds of the
Senate or a majority of Congress. 4 3 Debate in the Senate or the
Congress might produce outcomes besides outright approval or
rejection, namely, delay (by Senate filibuster) or amendments,
possibly necessitating renegotiation."
The Trade Act's "fast track" component modifies the twophase Constitutional process to a more elaborate three-phase
process: pre-authorization, shaped negotiation, and "fast track"
Congressional approval. 45 First, Congress gives pre-authorization for agreements such as the FTAA by enacting an extension
of the "fast track" legislation. 46 During this stage, Congress establishes objectives in advance of negotiations. 47 These objectives may concern environmental and labor issues.
Second, the President negotiates with the other countries
involved. 48 In contrast to the President's freedom of action without a fast track statute, the statute shapes the negotiating process. It provides for Congressional consultation during the
negotiations, and for participation by "mission-oriented" 4 9 administrative and non-governmental organization (NGO) repre41. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. For an example of the delay caused by such a filibuster, see Eric Phillips, World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
827, 857 n.153 (1996).
45. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 102, 151, 88 Stat. 1978,
1982-84, 2001-04 (1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191
(1994)).
46. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 696-97.
47. See id.
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e) (1994).
49. The term covers agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the Department of Labor ("DOL") which are oriented toward the
missions-environment and labor, respectively-in which they specialize. This
same term may be used at the White House ("mission-oriented" staff), at the
USTR level ("mission-oriented" subordinates), and in Congress ("mission-oriented" committees such as Senate Environment and Public Works).
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sentatives on issues including the environment and labor. 50
Hence, environmental and labor organizations face an interesting challenge: to maximize their leverage, by participating in
the negotiation, while retaining the option to oppose the ultimate agreement. Administrators and NGOs with environmental and labor concerns can positively influence the content of the
agreement. 5 1 Conversely, the trading interests can hope that
such an agreement will have a greater chance of approval, in the
final phase, as a result of such consultation and participation.
The third phase of fast track, Congressional approval, begins once the President reaches an agreement. 5 2 Approval consists of Congress enacting an implementing bill.5 3 The fast

track legislation prescribes that the approval must occur by one
up-or-down vote in the House and in the Senate, without opportunity for filibuster or amendment. 5 4 The President formulates
the implementing bill in a process involving Congress. The
types of provisions the implementing bill may or may not carry
have been dictated beforehand, during the fast track extension
stage.5 5 This includes what types of provisions regarding environmental and labor issues can go on that bill.
B.

THE EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR ISSUES ON

THE FAST TRACK

The 1974 arrangement lasted through the 1970s and 1980s,
until the rise of new trade problems and a third phase of trade
agreement structuring. When Mexico proposed negotiation of
NAFTA in 1990,56 new, sensitive issues were raised. Previously,
the major trade agreements had largely concerned relationships
between developed countries. 5 7 Creating a trade agreement between the developed United States and the less-developed Mex50. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 703-04.
51. See generally Abbott, Foundation-Building,supra note 31, at 916-942
(describing the success of NGOs in influencing the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, and their goals with regard to the FTAA).
52. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191.
53. See id. § 2191(e)(1).
54. Id. § 2191(f), (g) (1994).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
56.

See O'HALLORAN, supra note 35, at 160.

57. Even these had weakened public support for trade liberalization, as
some of the problems of the U.S. manufacturing economy seemed to relate to
unfair Japanese trade advantages that persisted through years and even decades of negotiations. See, e.g., Penny L. Turner, Note, The Feasibility of a
United States-Japan Free Trade Agreement, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 275, 297-98
(1991) (discussing Congress' protectionist reaction to Japanese competition).
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ico, however, posed new tensions. For example, members of
Congress, particularly House Democrats from "rust-belt" states,
believed that the relocation of assembly plants to Mexico under
the maquiladora program would hurt their constituents
58
unfairly.
The Bush Administration initially opposed inclusion of environmental and labor issues in the negotiations.5 9 In 1990-91,
however, these issues achieved prominence in Congressional
hearings. 60 The chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees formally wrote President Bush in
March 1991, asking him to comment on environmental and labor issues before Congress voted on fast track.6 1 President
Bush's formal response proposed a "parallel track" for environmental issues related to NAFTA, 6 2 thereby partly ushering in
the current era of including such issues alongside, if not entirely
on, the fast track system.
The second development in the emergence of environmental
and labor issues on the fast track occurred the following year.
President Bush had been accused of insensitivity to environmental issues concerning the Western Hemisphere.6 3 In submitting
the main body of NAFTA to Congress in August 1992, President
Bush had demonstrated only limited concern with environmental and labor issues.6 4 In contrast, then-candidate Clinton elaborated a new approach in a key campaign address in October
1992 in North Carolina. He advocated a middle path between
the two extremes of completely accepting the NAFTA main body
as negotiated by President Bush, and calling for its renegoti58. See JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND
THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 46 (1997).
59. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
1, 45-46 (1994).

60. See generally AUDLEY, supra note 58, at 50-62 (describing the success of
NGOs in bringing attention to these issues).
61. See id. at 52-53. The EPA Administrator served at this time as a conduit to environmental groups, negotiating with them what it would take for at
least some to support fast track. See id. at 53-56.
62. See id. at 56-57.
63. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 had boosted environmental-mindedness in Latin
American development. President Bush had taken an unsupportive stance toward the Rio Conference. See Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Free Trade and Environmental Enhancement:Are They Compatible in the Americas?, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993),
at 109, 110.
64. See id.

340
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ation. 65 Following up his new campaign approach, President
Clinton asked his trade representative to negotiate stronger environmental and labor protections in side agreements, 6 6 which
allowed him to win Congressional approval of NAFTA in 1994.67
The new position of including these issues, but addressing
them in side agreements, remained the consistent Administration position through the upheavals of the subsequent few
years. 68 For example, Clinton's trade representative, at a key
1995 hearing on consideration of a Congressional alternative to
exclude such issues from trade agreement negotiations, stated
the President's position:
As a candidate, he spoke at North Carolina State University to endorse
the NAFTA, but insisted that we negotiate agreements on labor and
environment as they intersect and interact with trade.... At the historic Summit of the Americas last December, the nations of this hemisphere agreed to recognize the link between trade and 69the
environment, as well as trade and improving working conditions.

The Presidential-Congressional debate that came to a conclusion
in 1997 continued to unfold this position.
Thus, the fast track legislation shapes the inclusion of environmental and labor issues in complex and profound ways.
Such shaping occurs at all three phases: negotiating objectives,
negotiating process, and "fast track" approval. The 1997 debate
over fast track extension pointed toward a particular set of orientations regarding environmental and labor issues during each
of the three phases. This Article has termed this the "alongside"
orientation, which is discussed in subsection C.
The "alongside" orientation manifests itself most clearly by
comparison to Congress' rejection of alternative orientations regarding environmental and labor issues for each of the three
65. The speech was entitled "Expanding Trade and Creating American
Jobs," and was delivered at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North
Carolina, on October 4, 1992. For a description of the speech and the process of
developing this position, see AUDLEY, supra note 58, at 69-70.
66. See Steve Charnovitz, The Nafta Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American
Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 257, 258 (1994).
67. See id. at 258-59. See also Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Addressing Environmental Concerns Regarding Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10
CONN.J. INT'L L. 221, 221-26 (1995) (explaining the Congressional debate).
68. See Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 257-58.
69. Fast Track Issues: Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Rules and Org. of the
House Comm. on Rules, 104th Cong. 146 (1995) [hereinafter Fast Track Issues
Hearing] (testimony of U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor).
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phases. 70 This Article terms the prime rejected orientation the
"off' the track orientation. Subsection D discusses how President Clinton and Congress devised the "alongside" orientation in
1995-97 by both rejecting the "off' the track orientation in 199596 and criticizing as inadequate the 1997 proposed orientation.

C.

How

"ALONGSIDE" WORKS: THE 1997 PROPOSED
LEGISLATION FOR INCLUSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND

LABOR ISSUES

In 1997, the Clinton Administration proposed legislation to
Congress that would provide for environmental and labor issues
to be included in the creation of trade agreements. 7 1 Section
2(a) of the proposed legislation calls for the establishment of
"overall trade negotiating objectives," which include "those aspects of foreign government policies and practices regarding labor, the environment, and other matters that are directly
related to trade .... ,,72 Similarly, section 2(b) requires that the
President establish "principal trade negotiating objectives," relating to the World Trade Organization and the International
Labor Organization (ILO), as to "worker rights and protection of
73
the environment."
Pursuant to this proposal, the Administration would inform
and consult with Congressional committees before and during
the negotiations.7 4 Participation of NGOs, administrative bodies with environmental and labor specializations, and business
groups, was also anticipated.7 5 In NAFTA, some of the environmental and labor requirements were placed in side agreements
rather than in the body of the trade agreement. 76
70. See Part I.D. infra.
71. Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997, H.R.
Doc. No. 105-30 (1997).
72. Id. § 2(a), 2(c)(5), H.R. Doc. No. 105-130. at 3,4.
73. Id. § 2(b)(7).
74. Id. §§ 3, 4.
75. Id. 88 3(c)(3), 4(c).
76. See generally Talks on Nafta Side Deals to Start Week of March 15,
supra note 9, at A3 (describing possible enforcement measures). Much debate
has concerned this matter of placement of terms in "side agreements" rather
than the "core" or "main body" of the agreement. For NAFTA, this had a concrete historical origin: President Bush had completed negotiation of the main
body of the agreement, and when then-candidate Clinton made his 1992 North
Carolina speech, placement of newly negotiated environment and labor terms
in the "main body" would have required renegotiation. There is no particular
reason that this sequence or something like it would occur for FTAA. That does
not mean that other methods, besides placement in a side agreement, will not
put environment and labor terms in a separate, and potentially lesser, category.
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Assuming the Administration reaches an agreement in the
form of a main agreement and side agreements, it then would
engage in a process of devising, in consultation with Congressional committees, the implementing bill that makes the necessary changes in U.S. law. 77 Congressional committees have the

power, if opposed to the agreement, to have either the House or
Senate vote on whether to preclude the implementing bill from
receiving "fast track" treatment.7 8 Assuming Congress allows
fast track procedures to remain in place, the Administration
would then submit the implementing bill. It would receive an
up-or-down vote, without amendments and without filibuster, in
the House or Senate. 79 Everything depends upon Congressional
approval of the implementing bill. Hence, the entire trade negotiation process of an issue depends on how the "fast track" procedure treats that issue.
The 1997 proposal takes an important position regarding
how environmental and labor requirements get implemented.
Section 3(b)(3)(B) provides that the implementing bills can include provisions "which are necessary or appropriate to implement such'trade agreement . . . and which are related to

trade."8 0 Thus, the proposal gives "fast track" treatment to environmental and labor implementing provisions which are "traderelated." One of the main goals of this Article is to explore the
meaning of "trade-related," and examine the reason the term encompasses as much inclusion of environmental and labor issues
as could occur in any event. This flexible interpretation of traderelatedness is discussed in Part IV. At this point, however, comparing the rejected alternatives to Clinton's proposal better illuminates how "alongside" developed.
D.

THE REJECTED ALTERNATWES

The "alongside" orientation is best understood by comparison with the alternatives rejected on the way to the 1997 debate
and beyond. More specifically, comparing the "alongside" orientation with the rejected "off' the fast track approach, as proposed by the 1995 Republican Congress, and the recent 1997
However, this Article declines to speculate about the packaging of terms into
one or more agreements, and instead addresses the other ways in which those
terms will be included to a greater or lesser extent.
77. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e) (1994).
78. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e).
79. See id. § (f), (g).
80. See Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, H.R. Doc.
No. 105-30, § 3(b)(3)(B).
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debate proposals, best illuminates the form that the "alongside"
approach ultimately is taking.
1.

1995 Republican CongressionalPosition: "Off"the Fast
Track

When the 1994 elections produced a Republican majority in
both the House and the Senate, the new Congress opposed fast
track treatment of environmental and labor matters. 8 ' From
the start of the 104th Congress, the new majority expressed a
desire for "avoidance of the use of environmental objectives as a
protectionist device."8 2 In a famous statement, House Speaker
Newt Gingrich declared that "[flast track was not designed to
circumvent regular legislative procedures with respect to mat3
ters unrelated to trade agreements."
At a House hearing in May 1995, the House majority party
clashed with the Administration on this point. House Republicans persisted in developing a draft fast track bill with "a re84
strictive approach to the trade and labor/environment link."
In September 1995, the House Ways and Means Committee reported a fast track bill supported by committee Republicans over
the objections of the Administration and committee Democrats.8 5 As reported, the negotiating objectives listed in the bill
omitted mention of environmental and labor goals.8 6 The bill
only allowed the fast track procedure to be used to implement
provisions "necessary" to carry out the trade agreement, re81.
82.

See Maggs, supra note 11, at 3C.
Rep. Crane Says Trade Panel Agenda Includes Chile, NAFTA, China,

Fast Track, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 53 (Jan. 11, 1995) (quoting
memorandum by subcommittee staff director).
83. Fast Track Issues Hearing, supra note 69, at 276 (statement by
Speaker Gingrich); see also Gingrich Urges Adoption of Fast-Track Authority,
Excluding Labor, Environment, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), May 24, 1995, available in Westlaw, BNA-IED Database (reporting an address by the Speaker in
which he indicated that "[tihe House is willing to authorize fast-track as long as
it does not have provisions linking trade benefits to labor and environmental
issues").
84. Fast-TrackDraft Bill Stalls as Members Get More Time to Consult, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1306 (Aug. 2, 1995).
85. See Trade Agreements Authority Act of 1995, H.R. 2371, 104th Cong.
§§ 2 (trade objectives) and 3(b)(3)(A)(iv) (fast track implementation bill "consisting only of... provisions necessary for the operation or implementation of such
trade agreement"); see also Ways and Means Reports Fast Track Without Bipartisan Backing, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Sept. 22, 1995, available in Westlaw,
BNA-BTD Database; Kantor Says Talks Will Continue on Ways and Means'
Fast-Track Bill, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1593 (Sept. 27, 1995).
86. See Trade Agreements Authority Act of 1995, H.R. 2371, § 2.
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jecting the previously used broader formula of "necessary or appropriate."8 7 Deadlock on the issue persisted.8 8
Chile provided a concrete focus for the issue.8 9 In December
of 1995, Congress considered the plan of renewing fast track just
for Chile's accession to NAFTA. 90 Since the new majority in
Congress opposed the inclusion of environmental and labor concerns, this plan did not get presidential support, and fell
through. 9 1 Chile had indicated willingness to join NAFTA if the
United States had fast track ready, but its hopes were dashed
when Congress and Clinton were unable to reach an agreement
92
on fast track authority.
Thereafter, the issue became one for the 1996 presidential
campaign. 9 3 Senator Dole repeated opposition to "adding 'extraneous' issues such as labor and environmental protection to
trade agreements." 94 Nothing further happened in 1996, as ob87. See id. § 3(b)(3)(A)(iv).
88. At that time, there was some expectation that the fast track authority,
excluding labor and environment matters, would be addressed in the 1995
budget reconciliation bill. However, that effort foundered. See Legislation to
Implement OECD Pact Will Be Introduced Soon, Staffer Says, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1975 (Nov. 29, 1995) (discussing the movement in September and October 1995 of the budget reconciliation bill from the Ways and
Means Committee to passage on the House floor). See also Charles Tiefer,
"Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's
1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 433-35 (1996).

89. See, e.g., Melissa Ann Miller, Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-TrackDebate, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 153 (1996)

(explaining that Chile refused to negotiate on joining NAFTA unless the President had fast track powers).
90. See id. at 154-55.
91. See Beth Ann Bivona, What Price Are We Willing to Pay for Our Environment?, 5 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 161, 171 (1996).

92. See id. See also Block & Herrup, supra note 67, at 221 (highlighting
the negotiations surrounding NAFTA and Chile).
93. The sharp differences were reported as follows:
Labor and Environment Stalemate
In an election year, partisan politics have made the fast-track extension even more problematic, with the administration and the GOP majority staking out diametrically opposed positions on the treatment of
labor and environmental issues.
The administration has stuck to its position-which goes back to
Clinton's 1992 campaign position-that labor and environmental issues are valid negotiating objectives in trade talks. In contrast, the
GOP largely believes that these issues should be dealt with on a separate track.
Block & Herrup, supra note 67, at 221.
94.

Id.
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servers noted, because the two sides had to see who would be95
come President.
With President Clinton's victory in the election, Congressional Republicans effectively abandoned the position they had
maintained since 1995.96 In 1997, 9 7 the Clinton Administration
made clear that it would insist on inclusion of such issues in fast
track trade negotiations, 98 notably through the President's
statements during a May 1997 trip to Mexico. 99 In May 1997,
and again in July 1997, Congressional Republicans floated, but
pulled back from the formula ultimately used, in which they relented to allow inclusion of trade and environmental issues that
95. Had former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole been elected, according to Rep. Robert T. Matsui (D-Calif.), Republicans "probably could have gotten a fast-track through that would have prohibited labor and the environment
for any negotiating purposes whatsoever. So it was probably in their political
interests to slow fast-track down and find out who was going to be the next
President." Ben Wildavsky, "Trade Fatigue," NAT. J., Jan. 18, 1997, at 116,
117.
96. The strategic positions of the two parties were explained as follows:
For more than two years, [Representative] Crane and Ways and Means
Chairman Bill Archer, R-Texas, have sought to grant Clinton broad
fast-track power.... But Clinton rejected the committee's 1995 bid, on
a party-line vote, to give him fast-track authority. His reason: The legislation lacked assurances that labor and environmental protections
would be written directly into future trade agreements-a key demand
of many Democrats and their allies.
Richard E. Cohen, Ways and Means' Fast-Track Slowdown, NAT. J., Sept. 13,
1997, at 1792.
97. Both sides kept their freedom of action, as the possibility of admitting
Chile to NAFTA was floated but not consummated. Neither the administration
nor Congressional Republicans put definite language forward regarding environment and labor issues. The Administration floated the proposal to have fast
track legislation drop all its negotiating objective language, including environment and labor language; however, this proposal simply failed. See Administration FloatsDropping Environment, Labor from Fast Track, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), Apr. 3, 1997, available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database.
98. A report on a Center For Strategic and International Studies forum on
NAFTA related:
The administration will continue to pursue labor and environmental
issues in the context of trade agreements, [Deputy Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for the Western Hemisphere Jon] Huenemann
said, adding that progress had been made in this area in both the
FTAA context and in the World Trade Organization. Chile is ready to
adopt NAFTA's side agreements on labor and environment, he
remarked.
USTR Official Stresses Importance of Fast-Track Ability for U.S. Trade, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), Mar. 10, 1997, available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database.
99. Speaking in Mexico City, "Clinton repeatedly highlighted the importance of labor and environmental protections which are built into the NAFTA."
Clinton Hails NAFTA, Calls for Expanded Free Trade, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
May 8, 1997, available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database.
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were "trade-related."10 0 The fast track debate that ensued further illuminates how Congress and the Clinton Administration
resolved the issue of fast track.
2.

1997 Debate on Fast Track Extension

In September 1997, President Clinton submitted his formal
request regarding fast track extension, with the proposed bill
language previously described. 10 1 After hearings, Senate and
House committees reported their own versions, which subtly
drew back from the level of inclusion of environmental and labor
issues which the Administration proposed.' 0 2 The Committee
Reports provided some detail on environmental and labor issues
which helped concretize what the term "trade-related" would
mean. The Senate committee reported a negotiating objective
opposing "the use of foreign government regulation and other
government practices, including the lowering of, or derogation
from, existing labor (including child labor), health and safety, or
environmental standards, for the purpose of attracting investment or inhibiting United States exports." 0 3 While such an objective did provide a way for the trade agreement to address
environmental and labor issues, 0 4 it fell short of the variety of
goals which advocates desired to strive for in such agreements.
The House committee reported a similar negotiating objective:
regarding labor, the environment, and other matters that are directly
related to trade:
(A) To ensure that foreign labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or
serve as disguised barriers to trade.
100. This period essentially ended with President Clinton's last address on
the subject before his formal request for the fast track renewal, in August 1997,
in which he reiterated his position of promoting labor and environmental protections as part of fast track. See Clinton ReiteratesImportance of Labor/Environment Link in Trade, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Aug. 26, 1997, available in
Westlaw, BNA-IED Database.
101. See Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997,
H.R. Doc 105-130 (1997). See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
102. All sides put great importance on the precise language used to describe
how environment and labor protection would be dealt with. See Peter Baker &
Paul Blustein, Clinton Searchesfor Middle on "FastTrack," WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1997, at A8.
103. S.1269, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(15)(B) (1997). See also S. REP. No. 102-105,
at 8-9 (1997) (committee report discussing the language of the bill).
104. For a modest defense of the provision as reported by the Senate Committee, see 143 CONG. REC. S11633 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Roth) (arguing that free trade does not necessarily result in fewer jobs for
American workers).
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(B) To ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from or waive
existing domestic environmental, health, safety or labor measures
105

Both committees also reported complex proposals regarding the
language, beyond the minimum "necessary," that could go in an
implementing bill. 10 6 Although these proposals tightened the
scope from the previous standard of "necessary or appropriate,"
they did not cut back as much as the 1995 Congressional
proposal.
As the matter moved from the Congressional committees to
the floor, the Senate critics of the proposed legislation attempted
a filibuster. 10 7 Among other arguments, they faulted its failure
to include sufficiently strong environmental and labor protections.108 They also cited the opposition position of national environmental groups.10 9 The Senate ultimately overcame the

filibuster, but the much needed boost that Senate approval was
expected to provide the legislation in the House never developed.
Rather, House critics of the fast track extension maintained
a steady drumbeat of opposition on many grounds, including, as
in the Senate, its failure to include sufficiently strong environmental and labor protections. 11 0 As Minority Leader Gephardt
stated:
Now, right now, the President is asking us for fast track negotiating
authority to get new free trade agreement with, say Brazil or Argentina or Chile or other countries across the world, and just as in 1991, I
voted for fast track for then-President Bush, I am quite prepared to
vote for fast track for President Clinton because obviously I think he
shares my values on these issues much more than President Bush did,
but I do not want again to go to a set of negotiations without the Con105. H.R. 2621, 105th Cong. § 102(b)(7) (A-B) (1997), available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Bills File.
106. See Administration and Archer Agree on Fast-Track Measure's Language, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1706 (Oct. 8, 1997).
107. See 143 CONG. REC. S11859 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); id. S12252 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Harkin); id.
S11737 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hollings); id. S11727 (daily
ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. S11719 (daily ed. Nov. 5,
1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
108. See e.g. 143 CONG. REC. S11859 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Leahy); id. S12252 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
109. See 143 CONG. REC. S11716 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
110. See, e.g. id. H10410 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pascrell)
(noting that bill as reported only prevents derogation from "existing" environmental and labor protections, and does not allow the United States to negotiate
for higher standards); id. E2141 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) (noting that it constrains the President's ability to negotiate environmental and labor concerns).
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gress being very clear about what we expect in macro terms to be in
these agreements. I did that once; I do not want to do that again....
I do not want the Brazilians to be misled as to what we will require in
the Congress in these treaties. We want labor and environmental enforcement of their laws in the core trade treaty with trade sanctions in
order to enforce it.11 1

The Clinton Administration attempted to respond to this
criticism with efforts that would complement the provisions on
environment and labor in the fast track legislation and demonstrate that the Administration would promote protection of the
environment and worker rights. 1 12 To this end, a high labor official testified in late October on initiatives to oppose child labor.". 3 Further, the Administration released a statement of
"Executive Initiatives" that were to accompany fast track legislation in November.". 4 As the informal vote counts remained
close in the House, the Administration and the House leadership
scheduled formal floor consideration,1 5 but decided on November 9 to give up. 1 16 Thus, to be precise, the House did not vote to
reject fast track extension in 1997, it simply did not take the
question to a floor vote.
Although Congressional resistance to fast track extension in
1997 marked a short-term setback for FTAA negotiations, it
heightened the importance of environmental and labor issues in
111. 143 CONG. REC. H88031 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Gephardt).
112. See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, 'FastTrack' Backers Switch to High
Gear: Clinton Mixes Concessions, Warnings on Trade Measure, WASH. POST,

Nov. 4, 1997, at A4.
113. See DOL Official Says Child Labor Issue To Be Addressed Under FastTrack Bill, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1866 (Oct. 29, 1997); Child
Labor's Impact on Free Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, available in 1997 WL
664834 (F.D.C.H.) (Oct. 22, 1997) (testimony of Andrew J. Samet, Acting Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor).
114. See ClintonAdministration's Statement of Executive InitiativesAccompanying Fast-Track Legislation, Released Nov. 3, 1997, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 44, at 1933 (Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Statement of Executive
Initiatives].
115. The House Committee on Rules held hearings, the last stage before
floor consideration. See Fast-Track Trade Agreement Procedures:Hearing on
H.R. 2621, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act, Before the House
Comm. on Rules, available in 1997 WL 702862 (F.D.C.H.) (Nov. 6, 1997) (testimony of Rep. Cliff Stearns).
116. For a description of the countdown toward the scheduled, but canceled,
climactic House floor vote, see Andrew Taylor, Clinton Sways Few Democratsas
House Sets Fast-Track Vote, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2667 (Nov. 1, 1997); Andrew Taylor, Clinton Loses First Opportunity After All-Out Fast-Track Push, 55
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2751 (Nov. 8, 1997); Andrew Taylor, Trade Agenda Left in
Limbo by Failure of Fast Track, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2828 (Nov. 15, 1997).
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the long run. In December 1997, House Minority Leader
Gephardt, the leader of the 1997 opposition, attempted to negotiate an agreement on fast track. 1 17 Moreover, while some bill
proponents thought further efforts unlikely, President Clinton
pledged to pass the measure in 1998.118 Thus, the 105th Congress might simply consider, later in 1998, some form of fast
track extension. However, assuming Congress bypasses such
consideration in 1998, it would become a priority for the 106th
Congress in 1999 after the 1998 election. This would mirror the
manner in which the 1996 election presaged the 1997 debate on
fast track extension." 9 Either way, when Congress faces the issue again, the treatment of environmental and labor issues will
be of great importance.' 20 Likewise, these issues will play an
important role in upcoming FTAA negotiations.
II.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR ISSUES IN FTAA

THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS AGREEMENT

In December 1994, at the Summit of the Americas, the
United States and thirty-three other Western Hemisphere countries announced their commitment to establishing a vast, hemisphere-wide free trade zone known as the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. 1 2 1 The FTAA is expected to create an integrated
economy with a GNP of $9 trillion. 1 22 Both the United States
and Latin America are expected to benefit substantially from
this agreement: the United States will get increased access to
the fast-growing markets of Latin American countries, 2 3 and
Latin American countries will get significant increases in their
24
already high-level of exports to the United States.'
117. See A.B. Stoddard, Gephardt Plans Fast-Track Bill Despite House
Dems' Opposition, THE HILL, Dec. 3, 1997, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
118. See Clinton Concedes Defeat on Fast Track; Pledges to Pass Legislation
Next Year, 14 Int'l Trade. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1944-46 (Nov. 12, 1997).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67, 95.
120. See Lewis, supra note 25, at A-26.
121. See Rossella Brevetti, Trade Policy: Americas Summit Leaders Back
Historic Trade Declaration, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 49 (Dec. 14,
1994).
122. See John M. Andersen, Hemispheric Commercial IntegrationAccelerates Toward 2005, 117 Bus. AM. 6 (Aug. 1, 1996).
123. See InternationalAgreements: Trade Ministers to Meet in Denver for
June Ministerial to plan FTAA, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 7 (Feb. 15,
1995).
124. See Andersen, supra note 122, at 6.

350

MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE[7

[Vol. 7:329

Although the economic opportunities from further economic
integration are substantial, the path to achieving such integration is complex. 125 The Summit of the Americas did not actually
begin FTAA negotiations, but instead began a process intended
to eventually lead to FTAA negotiations. 126 The process of arriving at an FTAA agreement has evolved considerably since
early proposals. 12 7 An early concept of simply expanding
NAFTA by admitting other Latin American countries has lost
ground.128 Instead, the FTAA process proposal has advanced on
three levels: through a series of international conferences at the
ministerial and sub-ministerial levels; through working groups
on particular areas; and through extensive debate in each country about various ways to proceed. 12 9 The United States has
participated intensively in these international meetings and
working groups. 1 30 At the same time, other regional and bilateral trade agreements have evolved, such as MERCOSUR in
Latin America. 13 1 As a result, competing agendas, both political
125. See Brevetti, supra note 121, at 49.
126. Id.
127. See Hon. Brian E. Morrisey, Building the Free TradeArea of the Americas: A Proposal by Canada, 14 ARIZ. J INT'L & Comp. L. 299, 299-300 (1997)
(reviewing progress of negotiations to date).
128. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creationof the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995).
129. See generally FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 179-80 (1995) (FTAA proposal has been
"the subject of extensive discussion and reporting"); Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers in International Trade: Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the
Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 357, 3386-87 (1997) (discussing the efforts of ministerials and working
groups).
130. See FTAA CVD/AD Working Group is FormulatingRecommendations,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1906 (Dec. 11, 1996) (working group on
countervailing and antidumping duties meeting in Washington D.C.); FTAA
Procurement Group Eyes Divergence/Convergence, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 45, at 1755 (Nov. 13, 1996) (United States chairs working group on government procurement); FTAA Dispute Settlement Working Group Has Been Under
Discussion, Sources Say, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 478 (Mar. 20,
1996) (United States hosted first ministerial meeting, set goals for next meeting, and proposed four new working groups); Rossella Brevetti, Chairs of 11
FTAA Working Groups Meet to Improve Coordination,Private Sector Input, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1305 (Aug. 14, 1996) (meeting of working
group leaders convened in Washington, D.C.).
131. See generally Richard L. Bernal, Regional TradeArrangements and the
Establishmentof a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
945 (1996).
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and substantive, are3 2 developing as preparation is made for

FTAA negotiations.

1

In May 1997, participating trade ministers at the Belo
Horizonte meeting recommended that formal negotiations of
FTAA begin at the Santiago summit in early 1998.133 Thus, as
countries are preparing for the fast approaching formal negotiations of the FTAA, the United States and other countries are
strategically planning
how to control the agenda and process of
134
the negotiations.
The expiration of fast track authority and the recent failure
to reinstate it, however, casts a pall on U.S. efforts in several
respects,' 3 5 particularly with the lack of guidance from Congress
about what terms the FTAA must include in order to achieve
ultimate U.S. acceptance. Perhaps the principal issue on which
guidance is needed is how to best deal with labor and the environment. An understanding of the detailed sub-issues on which
Congressional guidance is necessary requires an analysis of the
common aspects of those issues, followed by analysis of those aspects specific to environmental and labor issues.
B.

COMMON ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR ISSUES

Trade negotiators dealing with the common aspects of environmental and labor issues can break them into four general
categories. First, they must develop a process for negotiating
environmental and labor issues, particularly concerning how to
incorporate administrators and NGOs focusing on those issues
into the dialogue. The next two groups of concerns can be simply described as "external" and "domestic." External concerns
involve what the agreement should accomplish in the other
Western Hemisphere countries. A prime example is the ques132. See Rossella Brevetti, InternationalAgreements: Vice Ministers Need
Additional Meeting to Reach Consensus On FTAA Issues, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 7, at 283 (Feb. 18, 1998).
133. See Ed Taylor, InternationalAgreements: Trade Ministers Defer Decision of FTAA Negotiating Timetable Until Early 1998, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at 896 (May 21, 1997).
134. See Rosella Brevetti, InternationalAgreements: MERCOSUR suggests
Three Stages for FTAA's NegotiatingProcess, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38,

at 1491 (Sept. 25, 1996).
135.

Mechanically, the lapse eliminated the only way an agreement could

likely win approval. Moreover, the lapse inspired doubt, both domestically and
internationally, that sufficient support existed in the U.S. Congress to approve
an ultimate agreement. Still, such doubt always exists. Narrow votes to extend
fast track authority do not remove uncertainty; nothing removes it until the
final vote on approving and implementing an agreement.
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tion of how the FTAA should cause other countries to maintain
or to raise their environmental standards and environmental
enforcement. Domestic concerns involve the goals the agreement should accomplish, or at least not undermine, in the
United States. A trade agreement promises trading partners a
limit on federal and state "protectionist" legislation in the
United States. A chief domestic concern is ensuring that the
anti-protectionist limitation does not preclude appropriate
American environmental and labor regulation that protects the
quality of domestic conditions. The fourth issue is what form
the inclusion of environmental and labor matters should take in
the agreement itself and in the subsequent implementing
legislation.
1.

Process: Participationof Federal and Sub-Federal MissionOriented Agencies, and a Large Role for NGOs in
Negotiations and Implementation

"Process" aspects concern which actors will participate from
the United States in the negotiation and implementation of
FTAA. Obviously, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) leads the negotiation, 13 6 and American business groups
provide the most prominent non-governmental effort. To ensure
a more comprehensive airing of environmental and labor issues,
broader participation must occur.
One concern is the role of other federal agencies that have a
primary focus on environmental and labor concerns, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Labor (DOL). 137 The EPA Administrator has already played a visible role in steps toward FTAA. 138 A second concern is the
participation of sub-federal entities-state and local governments-which often provide the strongest environmental protections in the United States. 139 Third, just as business interests
136. See Abbott, Foundation-Building,supra note 31, at 941-43.

137. During NAFTA consideration, the EPA and the FDA served as cochairs of the U.S. delegation to two of the three standards-negotiating subgroups. See Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade Agreement's Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INr'L L. 379, 385
(1994) [hereinafter Housman, NAFTA's Lessons].
138. See U.S., Central American Countries Sign Sustainable Development
Pact, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1025 (Dec. 14, 1994).
139. Foreign challenges to state practices under trade agreements such as
GATT have created concern that new trade agreements such as FTAA could
challenge such state and local environmental protections. Accordingly, sub-federal entities usefully play a role in the development of trade agreements. See
Housman, NAFTA's Lessons, supra note 137, at 386-88.
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play an important background role in the working groups that
develop trade standards, environmental and labor NGOs can
play an important background role on environmental and labor
issues, 140 as long as they struggle, with Presidential assistance,
to attain that role. 14 ' The diligence of the United States in
pressing for NGOs to participate in FTAA negotiations will be of
great importance in the next few years.
2. External Concerns
When negotiations actually produce an agreement, the
United States can view what that agreement prescribes as covering either "external" or "domestic" matters. If it involves the
U.S. stance toward environmental and labor matters in other
countries, it is an "external" concern. If it involves matters
within the United States, it is a "domestic" concern.
The United States can further divide the external concerns
into three levels: the standards, dispute resolution, and continuation of unilateral powers. Addressing the standards first, one
significant U.S. "external" concern is that weak environmental
and labor requirements, or weak enforcement, in other countries
will create an inappropriate competitive disadvantage for U.S.
businesses. 1 42 This subject receives closer attention in the following sections that separately address environmental and labor standards.
A second external concern is over the agreement's sanctions,
which will be used to make the participating countries implement environmental and labor standards. The most important
aspect of these is the manner in which the dispute-resolution
process treats these issues. 143 Under NAFTA, it has been diffi140.

See generally William M. Reichert, Note, Resolving the Trade and Envi-

ronment Conflict: The WTO and NGO Consultative Relations, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 219 (1996).
141. As part of his NAFTA environmental package, President Bush placed
five representatives of national environmental groups on committees within the
Private Sector Advisory Committee system. In 1994, the Clinton Administration lobbied unsuccessfully for environmental NGOs to have observer status in

the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment; the other countries rejected
the proposal See U.S. Fails to Bring NGOs into Talks with WTO's Environmental Committee, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 762 (Sept. 21, 1994).
142. See Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 1
(1996).
143. See generally Jack Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute
Resolution Under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89
Am. J. IN'L L. 439 (1995); Kevin W. Patton, Note, DisputeResolution Underthe
North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 5 DuKE J. COMP.
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cult to impose sanctions on Mexico for non-compliance. 44 As a
result, the subsequent record under NAFTA has included disappointments on both environmental and labor issues. 145 Some
commentators have praised Mexican efforts at promulgating
standards and improving enforcement, 14 6 while14 others
have crit7
icized NAFTA as lacking effectuating "teeth."
A third external concern for the United States is the preservation of the right to use unilateral trade pressures upon partners. Congress has enacted provisions to take away favorable
trade treatment from developing countries that violate core
workers' rights. 48 The same mechanism has been proposed to
promote the U.S. environmental concerns in Latin America,

& INT'L L. 87 (1994); Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental
Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 593 (1993).
144. See Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade:NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastruction Development, 19 COLUM J. ENVTL. L. 59, 64-65 (1994) (explaining that a
1993 side agreement to NAFTA limits trade sanctions that can be imposed for a
country's failure to enforce environmental regulations).
145. See generally Laura Okin Pomeroy, The Labor Side Agreement Under
the NAFTA- Analysis of Its Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions
and Recommendations for Future Labor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 769 (1996); Symposium, The
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:Linking Labor Standards
and Rights to Trade Agreements, 12 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 815 (1997)
(describing a panel discussion which addressed both labor and environmental
problems).
146. See, e.g., Aaron Holland, Note, The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation:The Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement
on the Enforcement of United States Environmental Laws, 28 TEx. TECH. L.
REV. 1219 (1997); Noemi Gal-Or, MultilateralTrade and SupranationalEnvironmental Protection: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (1996).
147. See, e.g., Joel Millman, Nafta's Do-Gooder Side Deals Disappoint:Efforts to Protect Labor, Environment Lack Teeth, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at

A19; Robert Collier, NAFTA Labor Problems Haunt New Trade Debate, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 10, 1997, at Al.
148. See Juli Stensland, Note, Internationalizingthe North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 4 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 141, 151 (1995).
In the 1980s, Congress pioneered the "Super 301" provision which statutorily
forces the President to impose unilateral sanctions upon our trading partners
for unfair practices. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1994). While this mechanism
started with a concern for purely economic practices, Congress can adapt the
mechanism for other issues such as labor and the environment. For example,
child labor could be made, statutorily, an "unfair trade practice" for purposes of
Super 301.
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such as the avoidance of tropical deforestation. 14 9 Latin American negotiating partners may oppose the United States' exercise
of such types of unilateral powers, deeming this inappropriate
protectionism inconsistent with the multilateral thrust toward
free trade. 150 Yet, inclusion of environment and labor objectives
in the fast track legislation weighs heavily toward preservation
of the U.S. unilateral capabilities on these issues.
3.

Domestic Concerns

Free trade agreements pose a potential threat to the U.S.
domestic system of health, safety, and environment regulations.
A trade agreement results from trading partners' skepticism, if
not hostility, towards U.S. state and local regulations which
may inhibit access by foreign producers to the U.S. market. The
day has long passed in which the largest barriers around the
U.S. market consist of simple tariffs; now, non-tariff barriers
have much more importance. 15 1 Accordingly, foreign governments and foreign producers perceive trade agreements, such as
FTAA, primarily as a means to assure that non-tariff barriers
will not reduce their access to the U.S. market. To them, such
non-tariff barriers include what they consider protectionist components of the United States' domestic system of health, safety,
and environmental regulations. 15 2 Hence, trade agreements can
provide tools against U.S. domestic labor, safety, and environ15 3
mental regulations on both the state and federal levels.
149. See Mara Kimmel Hoyt, Note, Breaking the Trade Barrier: Common
Property Solutions to Tropical Deforestation, 5 MuNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 195,
215-16 (1996).
150. See Stensland, supra note 148, at 157.
151. See A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programsfor Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
209, 218 (1994); see also generally Kenneth A. Votre, Trade in Services: Proposals for the Liberalizationof InternationalTrade in Insurance, 13 BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 537, 549-50 (1993) (GATT has been effective in reducing tariffs but not
non-tariff barriers).
152. See Aseem Prakash, Green and Global, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
575, 582 (1997) (book review).
153. For example, one of the most prominent issues under NAFTA has been
Mexico's effort to break down barriers to Mexican truck drivers carrying cargo
into the United States. This has implicated both safety and labor concerns in
the United States, which has tougher licensing standards and largely unionized
drivers. See John Nagel, Mexican Trucks and DriversAre Safe for NAFTA Implementation,Experts Contend, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at 408 (Mar.
5, 1997); Trucking ProvisionImplementation Urged by Industry, State Officials,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 1, at 27 (Jan. 1, 1997).
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4. Agreement and Implementation Mechanisms
The role of environmental and labor issues in fast track
brings to the fore several aspects of the form and implementation of trade agreements. The key question here is the inclusion
of environmental and labor matters in the implementing bill by
which Congress approves and makes the requisite changes in
U.S. law to implement the trade agreement.15 4 This is part of a
larger controversy regarding the contents of the "fast track" implementation bill. Because the implementation bill does not
travel through normal Congressional procedures of amendment
and potential Senate filibuster, Congress, and to some extent
the public, have special sensitivity about the contents of the implementation bill.1 5 5 To some critics, this process of precluding
15 6
amendments and limiting debate seems "undemocratic."
More speculatively, some in Congress may fear that a Democratic President could conciliate environmental and labor critics
of a free trade agreement by placing provisions into an impleI5 7
menting bill unnecessary for the agreement itself.
C.

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Purely environmental concerns can also be categorized as
either "external" or "domestic." External concerns include process and product standards, while domestic concerns primarily
focus on the maintenance of United States domestic standards.
1. External
Process standards have remained a prominent subject of debate in the realm of external environmental standards. Environmental concerns can arise either from problems in products,
such as excessive pesticide residues in food, or by the processes
154. See C. O'Neal Taylor, supra note 59, at 46-47 (supporters of fast track
stated labor issue would be addressed in implementing legislation).
155. See John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 169 (1997).
156.

See id.

157. For example, business interests in Congress have opposed environmental measures such as constraining timber harvesting on public lands, and labor
measures such as a ban on striker replacements. Some in Congress might fear
that the President could put provisions of that kind - if not so broad, then
leaning in such directions - into the unamendable implementation bill for a
free trade agreement, making the implementation bill more palatable to moderate Democrats while forcing pro-business Republicans to swallow unpalatable
measures in order to get a desired trade agreement.
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that produce them, such as untreated process wastewater. It is
the process concerns that raise the more interesting question,
since the processes of production for what FTAA will cover can
occur in other countries. 158 The "Tuna/Dolphin" controversy illustrates this tension. 15 9 In Tuna/Dolphin, the United States
was not concerned with the quality or safety of the product, that
is, the content of the canned tuna, but rather with the environmental harm which the production process caused, namely the
consequences of certain tuna-fishing methods that resulted in
160
excessive dolphin capture.
A related issue concerns standards for labeling products regarding the claimed environmental virtues of the production
processes, often called "green labeling" or "eco-labeling,"' 6 1
which may well become an issue within FTAA.162 Because production and labeling occur in the producing country, the extent
to which the United States can influence standards and enforcement in the Latin American producing countries becomes an issue in negotiating the FTAA.
The external environmental standards issue then becomes a
question of degree: how much can the United States influence
its trading partners regarding standards and enforcement of
them, whether for product or process? Possible answers to this
question vary widely. 16 3 The highest degree of influence would
158. Within the United States, federal and state environmental agencies
impose regulations that protect the environment by regulating the processes for
production, and the United States has various reasons for concerning itself with
overseas production processes. For a discussion of this issue, see John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and EnvironmentalPolicies:Congruence or Conflict?, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 219, 226-29
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).
159. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, BISD 39th Supp. 155 (1991) reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991)
(unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna I].
160. See Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilitiesfor
GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247,
250 (1996).
161. See generally Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrieror Trade Boon?: A Critical
Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening"of World
Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205 (1996).
162. See generally Anahi Rama, Environment-Mercosur:"Duped" by TradeDriven Green Ads, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File (describing the increasing use, and misuse, of ecolabeling in the four Mercosur countries).
163. For the spectrum of approaches from total harmonization on down, see
Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protectionin Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 283-94 (1997).
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result in total harmonization of other countries' standards with
U.S. standards. A low level consists of nothing more than precluding opportunistic lowering of standards deliberately to obtain relocating of industries for which pollution control strongly
affects profit levels. 16 4 The bottom would be leaving the matter
to WTO rules, since the WTO has applied little to no pressure on
developing countries on the issue of environmental standards or
enforcement. 165

2. Domestic
A separate problem concerns the maintenance of high domestic U.S. environmental product standards, such as barriers
against the importation of Latin American products that cannot
demonstrate equivalent environmental standards to domestic
products. 166 To Latin American negotiating partners these
standards seem like protectionist barriers; 16 7 to environmentalists, however, the existence of a dispute-resolution mechanism
that could second-guess U.S. environmental product standards
makes globalization a serious threat to their hard-won domestic
gains.
The seriousness and impact of this issue is evident from the
history of GATT/WTO proceedings against the United States,
and from comparable proceedings in the European Union, regarding gasoline, 168 the tuna/dolphin issue,1 6 9 and automobile
164. See id. at 303-04.
165. See Schultz, supra note 17, at 429.
166. See Armin Rosencranz et al., Rio Plus Five: Environmental Protection
and Free Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 527, 533 (1997).
167. See id. at 534.
168. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, reprintedat 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996). Venezuela and Brazil brought the GATT case against the United States
reformulated gasoline regulations issued under the 1990 Clean Air Act. See
Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations,
19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 191-92 (Mar. 6, 1996). The 1996 WTO decision found the U.S. regulations on gasoline cleanliness in violation of WTO national treatment provisions, and in 1997, the EPA finally rewrote its rules. See
EPA Bows to Pressureon Gasoline Requirements, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1997, at
A4.

169. Mexico brought the first tuna/dolphin challenge to regulations under
the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act. See Tuna I, supra note 159; see also
generally Don Mayer & David Hoch, InternationalEnvironmental Protection
and the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 187 (1993).
The EC followed up with a second tuna/dolphin challenge that produced a 1994
panel report. Both reports went against the United States. See Yechout, supra
note 160, at 262-68. Congress finally moved in 1997 to loosen the definition of
"dolphin-safe" for tuna sold in the United States. See Deidre McGrath, Writing
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fuel economy. 1 70 FTAA could threaten to open the door to successful challenges against domestic U.S. product standards on
issues such as U.S. rules on pesticides.
D.

LABOR CONCERNS

FTAA negotiation on the fast track also raises the question

of just how strongly the United States will condition its trade
concessions upon Latin American compliance with standards of
labor rights that have support in International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and in U.S. legislation and policy, but
which some Latin nations themselves intensely oppose. Even

the original Plan of Action for FTAA committed the participants
to "further secure the observance and promotion of worker
17 1
rights, as defined by appropriate international conventions."
Albeit with limited effectiveness, the ILO has promoted labor
standards since its inception after World War J.172 Furthermore, as the worldwide GATT trade agreements evolved, the
United States has attempted to obtain implementation of labor
rights through the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1 73 as re4
cently as 1996.17
Different Lyrics to the Same Old Tune: The New (and Improved) 1997 Amendments to the Marine Mammal ProtectionAct, 7 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE,_;
Robert Collier, Mexican Fishermen Relieved by Tuna Deal: U.S. Embargo to
Save Dolphins Cost Them Dearly, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 1997, at A8.
170. The European Union successfully challenged automobile fuel economy
regulations under the Clean Air Act. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel,
United States-Taxes on Automobiles, GATT Doc. DS31/R, Oct. 11, 1994, reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 1374 (1994). See also Steve Charnovitz, The GATT Panel
Decision on Automobile Taxes, 17 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 921-25
(Nov. 2, 1994).
171. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of InternationalLabor Standards
and NAFTA: Retrospect and Prospects, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 472 (1995).
172. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEvELOPMENT,

TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE

WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996) (describing the efforts of
the ILO and other organizations concerned with labor standards).
173. See Robert T. Stranks, The New Jerusalem: Globalization,Trade Liberalization and Some Implications for Canadian Labour Policy, in NEW DiREcTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, LABOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGENDA 137,

164-65 (Keith H. Christie ed. 1995).
174. A major Clinton Administration effort in this regard showed the American policy still had strong life in it, though it did not achieve success. The Administration pushed hard to establish a WTO working party on Trade and Core
Labor Standards, or at least to enhance cooperation between WTO and the ILO.
However, the other WTO members, particularly developing countries, resisted.
For a description of both the Administration initiative and the resistance by
other WTO members, see Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour
Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor
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Frustration in the GATT/WTO arena has forced the United
States to explore alternatives to promote labor standards. In
the 1970s, the GATT allowed developed countries to give trade
preferences to developing countries, and Congress effectuated
this in the United States by the General System of Preferences
(GSP).17 5 Five general rights constitute the heart of the GSP
conditionality system: the right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition against forced labor;
protection against child labor; and acceptable conditions of
work, such as those concerning wages, hours, and occupational
safety and health. 176 American labor rights advocates have
been disappointed that the GSP system has not advocated further-reaching standards.' 7 7 Still, the GSP has produced improvements, compared to previous conditions, in a number of
Latin American countries, such as Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala,
178
and the Dominican Republic.
NAFTA represented the first major opportunity to transfer
the unilateral GSP conditionality system into a multilateral context, 17 9 and its significance as a predecessor, for FTAA has been
recognized.' 8 0 NAFTA took on a particularly hard challenge,
since labor abuses in Mexico are widespread and the enforcement of labor laws is weak.' 8 ' NAFTA's labor side agreement,
the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation
Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 131, 154-58 (1997) (book
review).
175. The United States has established and strengthened over the years a
set of potentially powerful conditions on each developing country's GSP treatment. Interested parties can ask the U.S. interagency review panel handling
this subject to withdraw a country's GSP treatment for failing to afford internationally recognized worker rights. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 112636.
176. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 998-1007; see also Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/os
in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 361, 368 (1997) (listing
the five rights in the context of possible models for enforcing international
human rights).
177.

See Iglesias, supra note 176, at 370.

178. See Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric Labor Rights Under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CoN. J. INTVL L. 337, 348-49
(1995).
179. See id. at 343.
180. See Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA's North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation:The Presentand the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403, 419-26
(1995).
181. See Christos C. Paraskevopoulos, NAFTA and Social Protection in
North America, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS 182, 184-85 (Christos C. Paraskevopoulos et al. eds., 1996).
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(NAALC), created a Commission for Labor Cooperation to work
cooperatively on labor issues.1 8 2 Each party has a National Administrative Office (NAO) to investigate allegations that another
party is not enforcing its domestic labor law in the areas of the
18 3
five labor rights.
84
The NAALC's functioning has received close scrutiny.
Some have applauded its actions, such as in its first case, which
considered inadequacies in the U.S. protection of labor rights, i8 5
while others have commented on its ineffectiveness.' 8 6 The
more knowledgeable analysis, however, focuses on NAALC's inadequacy.1 8 7 While the NAFTA labor accord had recognized all
five of the "core" labor rights, as they are generally called, it distinguishes among them in terms of its procedures.18 8 Two of the
rights, notably the right of association, which would protect
union organizing efforts, cannot trigger procedures leading to
sanctions at all.' 8 9 Only the three other labor rights, notably

including the protection against child labor, even lead into the
sanction system, which itself is quite limited.' 90 Critics charged
that the Mexican government, tilting strongly toward business
interests in the wake of the crushing blow of the peso crisis, has
squelched union organizing efforts, and that the NAFTA labor
accord did little to blunt this. 19 Moreover, the limited sanction
182. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,opened for signature
Sept. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
183. See Stensland, supra note 148, at 158-61.
184. For a defense of the NAALC, see The North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation:Linking Labor Standardsand Rights to Trade Agreements,
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 815, 837-41 (1997).
185. See, e.g., Sarah Lowe, Comment, The First American Case Under the
North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 481
(1997).
186. See generally, e.g., Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience
with NAFTA's Labour Side Accord, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 161 (1997); Fredrick
Englehart, Note, Withered Giants:Mexican and U.S. Organized Labor and the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
321 (1997); Jason S. Bazar, Comment, Is the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Working for Workers' Rights?, 25 CAL.W. IN'L L.J. 425 (1995).
187. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, The North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation:A New Frontierin North American Labor Relations, 10
CONN. J. INVrL L. 533, 561 (1995) (observing that NAALC is "a sort of administrative agreement, with no real force of law").
188. See Iglesias, supra note 176, at 361-70.
189. See id. at 370.
190. See id. at 370-71.
191. See id.
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system has not actually produced even the sanctions which in
theory it could.192

Understanding the environmental and labor issues facing
negotiators and interested parties in developing the FTAA is not
enough. As discussed in Part II, for any issue to be included in
fast track legislation, it must be "trade-related." Only by understanding trade-relatedness can one understand how to place important U.S. concerns "alongside" the fast track.
III.

"TRADE RELATEDNESS" AND FAST TRACK: THE
FLEXIBLE CONCEPT OF TRADE-RELATEDNESS

As previously noted, the 1997 President's fast track extension proposal introduced the key language that fast track treatment should cover "trade-related" environmental and labor
matters. In other words, to determine whether and how an issue enjoys coverage under the fast track authority, one must
first determine if it is "trade-related." Based on the foregoing
discussion, the flexibility of the concept of "trade-relatedness"
appears in two dimensions: economic and political. Each warrants separate discussion.
A.

ECONOMIC DIMENSION

When considering the economic dimension of "trade-relatedness," the enormous debate over trade and the environment in
the past two decades defies easy summation, but two polar views
bear noting. The "free trade" extreme pole in the debate emphasizes the general efficiency benefits of free trade demonstrated
by trade growth generally in recent years and, more particularly, the economic liberalization-based expansion in Latin
America. In this view, each country best makes its own nearterm tradeoffs between economic welfare and environmental
and labor improvements. Trade growth, in the long term, can
pay both for higher welfare and for enhanced environmental and
labor conditions. Developing countries like Latin America might
make a pro-development near-term tradeoff, while more developed countries like the United States would weigh environmental and labor improvements more heavily. Nevertheless,
advanced countries should not try to make their standards into
192. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 187, at 569 ("the highest level of enforcement for purported violations [of the NAALC] ... is simply that of'ministerial consultations.' Moreover, the U.S. NAO [National Administrative Office]
has to date been somewhat reluctant to recommend that cases proceed even to
this level").
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trade barriers, which would amount both to inefficient protec19 3
tionism and interference into other countries' internal affairs.
The opposite "sustainable development" pole in the debate
emphasizes the environmental and labor harms from uncontrolled globalization, particularly noting the ultimate limits of
what world ecology can bear and the numerous possibilities for
international effects of a nation's excesses. As regional integration, in general, and FTAA, in particular, take center stage in
trade negotiation, this view points to the imbalance between the
high-safeguards U.S. system and the low-safeguards system of
19 4
developing Latin American countries.
For example, the United States has a concrete interest in
ensuring that U.S. businesses (and their employees) are not
inappropriately disadvantaged by their obedience to the comparatively high standards the United States has created in environmental and labor matters. The reduction of other trade barriers
exposes United States businesses to competition from Latin
American businesses subject to less regulation. Of course, Latin
American negotiating partners can argue that letting their own
businesses have the competitive advantage of lesser regulation
in these matters is a legitimate example of the general economic
thrust that drives trade. 195
193. Classic pro-free trade economic analysis, not reaching this extreme pole
yet exploring some of its points, can be found in such works as MICHAEL RAUSCHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FACTOR MOVEMENTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1997); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECONCILING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (1996); KARL W.
STEININGER, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: THE REGULATORY CONTROVERSY AND A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION (1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 159

(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993); Ursula Kettlewell, GATT-Will Liberalized
Trade Aid Global Environmental Protection?,21 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55

(1992).
194. Classic pro-environment and labor economic analysis, not reaching this
extreme pole yet exploring some of its points, can be found in such books as
THOMAS ANDERSSON ET AL., TRADING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT: ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY (1995); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE
GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994); OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1994); Herman E. Daly, Problems with Free Trade:
Neoclassical and Steady-State Perspectives, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 147 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).

195. See Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, IntegratingLabor and Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look
Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719, 768 (1993).

364

MINN.

J

GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 7:329

In any event, whatever the outcome of the debate about
what is or is not an appropriate competitive advantage from
lesser regulation, typically economists would deem provisions
that sort out appropriate from inappropriate competitive advantages to be "trade-related."1 96 What these diverse economic theories indicate is not the precise content of the concept of "traderelatedness," but its flexibility. When the 1997 debate in Congress came to focus on this concept, Congress simply was not
elevating one economic school or the other; rather, it was weaving a path toward a compromise between narrow and broad
views.19 7
B.

POLITIcAL DIMENSION

The political dimension consists of reviewing the 1995-97
political process that led to elevation of the concept. During this
time, the various environmental and labor issues discussed in
Part II figured prominently in the national debate between proponents of what the 1997 extension law ultimately chose, and
proponents of the chief alternatives. Here "trade-relatedness" is
defined by contrast with the 1995-96 Republican Congressional
alternative of excluding environmental and labor issues from
trade talks altogether. There is little basis to believe that
"trade-relatedness" excludes any of the issues discussed in Part
II. The Administration, which won this battle, has adhered
throughout to the position introduced at President Clinton's
1992 North Carolina address and continued through NAFTA's
approval, namely, that the United States can include serious environmental and labor positions in regional trade agreements
with developing Latin American partners-first Mexico, and
now the whole FTAA.1 98 During consideration of the 1997 Act,
Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) noted that the use of the 'trade196. A key provision in NAFTA's text speaks in a limited way to the concern
over inappropriate competitive advantage. Article 1114.2 provides that "[tihe
Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing
domestic health, safety or environmental measures." North American Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605, 642 (1993).
197. Had the differing blocs on this issue achieved a precise agreement on
the subject, Congress would have used a more precise set of terms, or provided
more definitions. For example, it could easily have referenced the relatively
restricted view of trade-relatedness that developing countries have pushed in
the WTO, in which they assert that inclusion of environment and labor issues
in trade negotiation amounts to disguised protectionism.
198. See C. O'Neal Taylor, supra note 59, at 32-53.
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related' standard could increase the President's ability to include issues and policies in trade bills. 19 9
As far as what would not be trade-related, the USTR gave
this example: "The example used in 1993 was pension reform,

would not be appropriate add-ons to a fast track bill."20 0 In this

regard, it matters that the 1997 debate suggested basically retaining, with some modification, a version of the traditional forbill could contain matters
mulation that the implementation
"necessary or appropriate." 20 1 The 1995 debate had clarified
20 2
what the term "appropriate" signifies.
That example of what is budgetarily "appropriate" to an implementation bill, even though it was not the subject of interna20 3
tional negotiation and is not in the international agreement,
199. Senator Gramm stated:
It would give the president license to negotiate agreements that would
impose labor standards in the United States, not just around the
world, and he could bring such an agreement to the floor of the Senate
and the House without our having any ability to amend it whatsoever.
Fast Track Trade Authority: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
105th Cong. 18 (1997) [hereinafter Senate Finance Comm. Hearings]. Senator
Gramm further noted that "labor and environmental conditions" could be included "under code name words like 'sustainable growth' to set limits that
would have the effect of domestic law in imposing constraint on American industry and agriculture ....Obviously, something that reduces trade is traderelated." Id.
200. Id. at 35. The USTR continued, "We have added a limitation on that
whatever else was appended to the fast track legislation would also have to be
trade related because of concerns two years ago that pension reform had been
on a fast track bill and that seemed germane." Id. at 39.
201. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
202. When the House Ways and Means Committee reported its 1995 Republican proposal, which omitted the term "appropriate," dissenting Democratic
views explained what the missing term encompassed, explaining:
The reported bill would no longer permit "appropriate" measures to be
included in fast track bills. Provisions regarded as "appropriate" to implement trade agreements were included in previous fast track bills
both to gain political support and to enable proper administration of
the trade statutes and Congressional oversight. These provisions have
had bipartisan support in the Committee on Ways and Means. Why
would we want to reduce that support, both within the Committee and
for passage in the House, as well as to reduce the ability of agencies to
administer the laws effectively or for Congress to oversee their
implementation?
H.R. REP. No. 104-285, at 29 (1995).
203. For example, under Congressional budget rules, an implementing bill
that moderately reduces revenue by lowering some tariffs may need provisions
to raise revenue, so that the bill as a whole is deficit-neutral. Since these provisions do not require international negotiation, some object to fast track treatment on the rationale that the President should not be able to make revenueraising decisions that are not subject to Congressional debate and amendment.
Still, such provisions are not "necessary" to an implementation bill, since other

6MNv, J

366

GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 7:329

shows how environmental and labor matters which actually
were the subject of international negotiation and actually were
in the international agreement are clearly "necessary and appropriate." "Trade-relatedness" does not exclude any environmental or labor issue that has appeared, or has a prospect of
appearing, in trade negotiations. Rather, it aims to exclude
completely extraneous provisions that an Administration might
put into a trade agreement implementation bill simply to win
20 4
domestic support.
IV.

SYNTHESIS: PROSPECTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LABOR ISSUES "ALONGSIDE" THE FAST
TRACK FOR FTAA

In sum, the 1997 debate signals that environmental and labor issues will become part of the United States' negotiating
objectives, which would open the way for their inclusion in implementing legislation: these issues are "alongside," not "off,"
the fast track. Any viable FTAA negotiations will have to satisfy
the political realities demonstrated in the 1997 debate. The
question thus becomes what approaches the United States
might take in FTAA negotiations to include these issues without
undermining FTAA. These approaches include affecting the
process of FTAA negotiations, as well as addressing the external
and domestic concerns the United States has.
A.

PROCESS ISSUES

As previously described, the United States has been in the
forefront of having its mission-oriented agencies, its states, and
above all the NGOs, 205 participate in negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. In contrast, the Latin American
FTAA negotiating partners have resisted this. For example, in
the 1997 preparatory process for FTAA, labor organizations
sought official recognition for their own forum, but vetoes from
nations do not negotiate an agreement on the domestic question of revenueraising. Such provisions are, however, "appropriate" to an implementation bill,
since Congressional budget rules require revenue-raising to make the bill deficit-neutral while other nations do not require similar action.
204. See supra note 157 (discussing such potential Administration legislative proposals that would "sweeten" a deal for environment and labor supporters as curbing timber harvesting on public land or banning striker
replacement).
205. The United States pressed for its NAFTA environmental side agreement to provide for a role for NGOs in presenting issues to the dispute resolution process. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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other countries prevented this. 2 06 Latin American FTAA negotiating partners greeted coolly the U.S. attempts to create
study
20 7
groups on trade/labor and trade/environment issues.
The role of these entities has significance, both on the specific issues that NGOs might press, and for the possibility that
the globalization of business organizations might be countervailed by a globalization of advocates of environmental and labor interests. 20 8 In 1997, labor unions and environmental
organizations worked intensively to defeat the extension of fast
track. Since they opposed authorization for an FTAA, it may be
argued that they should not participate in its negotiation and
implementation.
A look back at NAFTA's passage, however, suggests the contrary. Environmental and labor groups that campaigned
against extension of fast track in 1991 created leverage for other
groups to argue from "within" that NAFTA should include such
issues. Once President Clinton, by commencing negotiation of a
supplemental NAFTA environmental agreement, showed he seriously intended to increase the inclusion of environmental issues, environmental groups re-positioned themselves. At that
point, they formulated
requests for negotiations that were politi20 9
cally feasible.
The narrow margin of the informal House vote-counts in
1997 on extension of fast track reflects the necessity that
FTAA's negotiating process demonstrate to the press, the public,
and to moderate members of Congress that sensitive U.S concerns are being taken into account. President Clinton can legiti2 10
mately argue to Latin American FTAA negotiating partners
206. See Mario Osava, Unions Charge They Are Kept Out of FTAA Negotiations, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File.
207. See Rossella Brevetti, Vice Ministers DiscussStructure of FTAA Talks,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1912 (Nov. 5, 1997).
208. See generally Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under
NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement: It's Easy to Use, But Does It Work?,
26 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,031 (1996); Frona M. Powell, EnvironmentalProtection in
InternationalTrade Agreements: The Role of Public Participationin the Aftermath of NAFTA, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 109 (1995); Mark J. Spaulding, Transparencyof EnvironmentalRegulation and Public Participationin the
Resolution of InternationalEnvironmental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1127, 1131-41 (1995).

209. See AUDLEY, supra note 58, at 88-93.
210. It is significant that President Clinton's "Executive Initiatives" in November 1997, in the final push for a fast track extension, recalled his commitment to opening the WTO's dispute resolution mechanisms to NGO roles. See
Statement of Executive Initiatives,supra note 114.
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that if they close the door on environmental and labor NGO participation, they will in effect, be telling environment and labor
groups to work as early and as hard as possible to block approval
of a final FTAA which might otherwise have a fair chance of success. NGO participation also provides a response to the commonly voiced critiques of the trade agreement process that it
lacks transparency, and denies "democracy," on issues of vital
concern to the U.S. public.
B.

EXTERNAL ISSUES

The U.S. position on external environmental and labor issues will certainly begin with an attempt to reduce inappropriate competitive advantage for Latin American countries
resulting from lower standards. In 1997 hearings, both the
USTR and the Treasury Secretary testified about the inclusion
of an explicit negotiating objective addressing these issues.
Although the bill establishing the WTO included such an objective, the objective applies equally, if not more so, for FTAA,
where the United States has greater leverage to achieve it. Secretary of Treasury Rubin explained the importance of including
such an objective when negotiating the WTO agreement.
[W]e have an enormous economic self-interest... that through workers' rights and collective bargaining and whatever other mechanisms
may be and also through appropriate focus on the environment, that
the labor and environmental standards increase as well as the productivity. Otherwise, we will find that we are at increasing competitive
disadvantage because of a suppression, if you will, of
wages and envi2 11
ronmental standards in these developing countries.

The USTR stated: "And this objective as it is reflecting of the
WTO jurisdiction attempts simply to indicate that we intend to
pursue vigorously in the WTO issues that pertain to the environment. Issues that pertain to worker rights, including child
2 12
labor."
In FTAA negotiations, the United States may look for a variety of solutions, including foreshadowing, but not completing,
a basis for progress on other fronts, both multilateral and unilateral. It may achieve more success where it finds approaches
that protect environmental concerns while appealing to Latin
American countries on one of several grounds: recognition of
their sovereignty, matching their own environmental move211.
212.

Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 199, at 31.
Id. at 32.
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ment, 213 or providing "carrots" as well as "sticks." One key possibility consists of emphasizing the enhanced enforcement of
whatever standards the producing countries adopt. This approach, which was taken by NAFTA toward Mexico, is easy on
the sovereignty concerns of the other countries, but still capable
2 14
of yielding tangible benefits.
A particularly promising approach is drafting trade agreements so that they accord recognition to international environmental agreements (IEAs). 2 15 In this way, FTAA could link up
with implementation efforts for a number of international environmental agreements, such as the convention to combat desertification. 2 16 As with placing an increased emphasis on
enforcement, rather than on changing standards, this approach
goes easier on sovereignty concerns, to the extent that Latin
American countries have already agreed to these IEAs and need
only give them the priority that goes to implementing economic
programs of which the other trade agreement provisions are a
part.
Another approach, the key aspect of which has been called
"transboundary remediation," is to use trade agreements to accord recognition to international financing and aid on environmental projects. For example, NAFTA's side agreement
established a complex system for financing environmental
projects in the border region of the United States and Mexico,
including the creation of a North American Development Bank.
The Inter-American Development Bank has an environment division that provides loans for environmental projects. 2 17 An arrangement by which FTAA materially helps in financing the
environmental infrastructure of Latin American countries is a
practical way to unify the arguments of both free traders and
environmental advocates-trade is used to help developing
213. See, e.g., Jonathan Friedland, Green Chile: Across Latin America, New
EnvironmentalistsExtend Their Reach, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1997, at Al.
214. See PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAUL1EU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 4849 (1996).
215. For example, section 104 of NAFTA provides that obligations under
several such agreements prevail in the event of any inconsistency with NAFTA.
Housman, NAFTA's Lessons, supra note 137, at 398-400.
216. See Regional Desertification Unit for Caribbean,Latin America to Be
Set Up in Mexico City, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), June 26, 1997, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR File.
217. See Development Bank's Environment Chief Declares Commitment to
Loan Expansion, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNAEVR File.
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countries become able to afford environmental protection, while
simultaneously directly responding to the concerns of
environmentalists.
A great deal will depend on the extent to which the United
States offers to trade off acceptance of other countries' positions
in particular business sectors for their acceptance of environmental and labor safeguards. This, in turn, will adumbrate
possibilities during Congressional consideration of implementation legislation for FTAA. 2 18 Just as President Clinton "sweetened" the NAFTA deal for Congressional approval by
negotiating new environment and labor side agreements, so
FTAA negotiations may anticipate not only the acceptability of
FTAA's own treatment of these issues, but the direction of follow-on efforts by the President and Congress.
Perhaps the most head-on confrontations will occur regarding labor issues. For example, Chile has resisted any change in
its antiunion legislation, despite the adverse effect this has had
on its trade negotiations with the United States. 2 19 Moreover,
the recently created MERCOSUR conspicuously does not cover
2 20
labor issues.
A potentially effective approach for dealing with labor issues might be to emphasize that Latin American trading partners are already subject to some existing U.S. laws and ILO
conventions. The United States could start from a refusal to
yield on its existing laws, such as the GSP, and from the position
that Latin American signatories to ILO conventions have accepted those conventions. One of President Clinton's November
1997 "Executive Initiatives" complementing fast track was to
conduct reviews of the labor laws and practices of prospective
partners in free trade agreements. 2 2 1 From this, the United
States could add, as with NAFTA, that if its trading partners
attempt to woo investment or trade by reducing their labor stan218.

For example, an FTAA will face some of the same National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA) hurdles that NAFTA did. See generally Steve
Charnovitz, No Time for NEPA: Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 MINN. J.

GLOBAL TRADE 195 (1994) (describing operation of NEPA and need for environmental assessments in general).
219. See Matt Moffett, Pinochet's Legacy: Chile's Labor Law Hobbles Its
Workers and Troubles the U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at Al.
220. See Marcelo Montenegro, Labor and Mercosur, in FREE TRADE AND EcoNOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN LATIN AMERICA 181 (Fred Rosen & Deidre McFadyen

eds., 1995).
221. See Statement of Executive Initiatives, supra note 114.
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dards or failing to enforce them, they would be acting
2 22
inappropriately.
Finally, the United States might attempt to introduce dispute resolution efforts tailored specifically for labor issues. In
NAFTA, the United States took a graduated approach to labor
issues, providing a more labor-friendly enforcement mechanism
for three issues, including child labor, and a less labor-friendly
mechanism for two other issues, including the key issue of union
organizing. The use of a similar technique which might pave the
way for graduated treatment of labor issues might have two
manifestations. First, the United States could use labor issues
as tiered readiness criteria for the admission of particular FTAA
countries to particular levels of trade benefits. Second, it could
provide for sanctions such as partial "snap-backs,"-re-raising
of U.S. tariff barriers upon determinations of shortfalls on par2 23
ticular labor issues.
C.

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Regarding domestic issues, the 1997 debate seemed to lead
to a clear conclusion that the United States will not allow agreements such as FTAA to force a lowering of United States' domestic standards. As the USTR testified: "[W]e must be mindful of
the fact that we preserve the right to set our own health and
safety standards, however high we wish those standards to be,
22 4
and this is also a principle enshrined in the WTO."

Here, again, the political background to the 1997 extension
provides important negotiating guidance. 225 Any suggestion of
lowering U.S. domestic standards would have stirred up intense
opposition to trade agreements. Thus, the United States cannot
222.

As the USTR testified in 1997: "With respect to the question of specific

barriers to trade.., we see the very important principle, that foreign countries
should not lower their existing health and safety standards, should not lower
their existing environmental standards to attract investment." Senate Finance
Comm. Hearings, supra note 199, at 29.
223. Approaches such as tiered readiness criteria and snapbacks are discussed in Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 301, 330-35 (1995).
224. Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 199, at 30.
225. Perhaps the single most symbolically important NAFTA issue regarding lowering of United States' domestic standards concerned allowing Mexican
truck drivers who had not gone through the equivalent of state licensing procedures in the United States to haul cargo. President Clinton backed away from
forcing this change, even though NAFTA had seemed to anticipate it. President
Clinton deferred immediate action of the kind desired both by Mexico and by
industry-allied state governors. See supra note 153.
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offer such a proposal during FTAA negotiations. If Latin American trade partners desire a kind of market access that can be
achieved only by invalidation of domestic standards, they will
have to deal with the frank disbelief in U.S. public opinion that
its high environmental and other standards actually amount to
protectionism.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE EVOLVING
FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR
ISSUES ON THE FAST TRACK

The 1997 fast track debate brought environmental and labor issues to the center of trade agreement decision-making for
FTAA. A polarized Congress, which initially pushed one way
and then the other, did not extend fast track, in part, because of
the fear that strong environmental and labor standards would
not be included in negotiations. This debate has locked inclusion of environmental and labor issues into international negotiation. The integration of the U.S. economy with those of its less
developed trading partners makes these issues a central focus of
public concern over the effect of globalization. Only inclusion of
the issues assuages this concern. Whatever the basis on which
FTAA negotiations proceed-whether with the expectation of
fast track extension in 1998, or on some other basis-it must
take into account these issues to achieve ultimate Congressional
approval of any FTAA agreements.
Various groups and trends will influence exactly how labor
and environmental issues will be dealt with in the formation of
the FTAA. The system of trade agreement negotiation, and fast
track approval, does best at those environmental and labor issues which starkly pose the issue of inappropriate competitive
advantage for other nations. Since negotiation and approval
centrally concern how other nations, and how the U.S. public,
perceive what the agreement does to the U.S. trading position,
the issue of inappropriate competitive advantage translates
readily from the national to the international agenda and back.
Other environmental and labor issues do not travel so easily. Within the United States, the relative fortunes of the two
major political parties affect attitudes toward environmental
and labor issues. Presidents of different parties treat them differently; Congressional majorities of different parties treat them
differently. To some extent, the trade negotiating process operates as an intermediary, while developments can occur in other
contexts. On domestic issues, environmental and labor regula-
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tion creates potential barriers to foreign trade that the trade negotiation process can only deal with gingerly. On external
issues, the United States pushes its views through multilateral
negotiation of IEAs and, sometimes, through unilateral
legislation.
The trade negotiation process accomplishes a good deal
merely by keeping trade agreements from undermining what occurs on these issues in other contexts. Ideally, however, it does
more. It provides a series of ways that the Congressional-Presidential interaction can take readings of the temper of the U.S.
public on these issues, and effectively translate them into negotiating positions at those key moments in trade negotiations
when the nations have each other's attention. If so, then FTAA
negotiations will yield tangible progress in the Americas in the
important sphere of trade-related environmental and labor
issues.

